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The amount individuals spend on healthcare has increased 
significantly over the past thirty years. In 2010, healthcare spending 
was approximately one sixth of gross domestic product, and it is 
expected to increase to one fifth of gross domestic product by 2021.
1
 
Fixing America’s healthcare spending problems is vital for the 
economy because these costs reduce business investment by placing 
downward pressure on the consumption of other goods.
2
 To contain 
healthcare costs and improve quality, Congress passed the Patient 
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Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) in 2010.
3
 Only the future 
will determine whether the ACA effectively achieves these goals. 
This Note discusses trends in hospital consolidation and its 
influence on healthcare costs along with the impact that the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Messner v. Northshore University HealthSystem 
will have on healthcare spending in the private payor market. In 
Messner, the Seventh Circuit certified a class action in which the 
plaintiffs claimed that a Chicago area hospital network engaged in 
anticompetitive practices, and in doing so, raised prices for private 
payors.
4
 More specifically, the Note argues that the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) will 
have a more prominent role in policing hospitals’ monopolistic 
practices in light of (1) the ACA’s effects on consolidation in hospital 
markets; (2) plaintiffs’ ability to survive Daubert challenges on 
motions for class certification; (3) and trends in class action litigation.  
Part I explains economic incentives and the effects of rapid 
consolidation in the healthcare industry. Part II discusses the history of 
antitrust enforcement actions and the legal issues that are unique to 
hospital antitrust cases. Part III recounts Messner’s history from an 
administrative action to a private class action, and Part IV explores 
Messner’s deterrent effect, or lack thereof, on hospital anticompetitive 
behavior.  
 
I. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY & 
RISING PRICES FOR PATIENTS 
 
A. The Role of the Third Party Payor 
 
The reasons for rising healthcare costs are as complex as the 
industry itself. The asymmetry of information among the patients, 
                                                 
3
 Ken Glazer & Catherine A. LaRose, Accountable Care Organizations: 
Antitrust Business as Usual?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2011, at 1. 
4 
Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012), 
reh’g denied (Feb. 28, 2012), overruled sub nom. In re Evanston Northwestern 
Healthcare Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 268 F.R.D. 56 (N.D. Ill. April 12, 2010). 
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providers, and payors that pervades the industry causes healthcare 
delivery to be incredibly inefficient.
5
 In most markets for goods or 
services, the customer pays the provider directly; however, in the 
healthcare market a third party, such as the government or an 
insurance company, generally pays for the patient’s healthcare.
6
 This 
system is called the third party payor system, and it creates an 
asymmetry of information between the patient, who depends on the 
provider’s advice, and the provider, whom the third party pays.
7
 
Because providers are paid for each procedure they perform and the 
patient may never receive a bill, providers are tempted to prescribe 
more services than may be necessary while guising these services as 
beneficial to the patient.
8
 The troubling fact is that this system does 
not necessarily create better outcomes for the patient, and it lacks self-
correcting cost control mechanisms.
9
  
In addition, rapid hospital consolidation is compounding the 
healthcare spending problem, and this phenomena has been one of the 
less publicized causes for increasing healthcare costs.
10
 Consolidation 
has increased hospitals’ local market power, particularly when rival 
hospitals, defined as hospitals located within seven miles of one 
another, merge.
11
 This market power enables hospitals to raise prices 
                                                 
5
 Len Nichols, Making Health Markets Work Better Though Targeted Doses of 
Competition, Regulation, and Collaboration, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
7, 12–13 (2011).  
6
 In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2007 
WL 2286195, at *7 (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Evanston Northwestern 
Healthcare Commission Decision]. 
7




 Id. at 13. 
10
 Avik Roy, Hospital Monopolies: The Biggest Driver of Health Costs Nobody 




 Avik Roy, Hospital Consolidations and Healthcare Costs, YOUTUBE (Nov. 
18, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nq_-
gzO1pZ0&feature=player_embedded#! [hereinafter Hospital Consolidations and 
Healthcare Costs].  
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for private payors and order doctors to prescribe additional 
unnecessary procedures while quality lags.
12
  
Private insurers have ineffectively prevented hospitals’ 
monopolistic practices because they can spread these costs across their 
networks, and they lack incentives to change their current contracting 
processes. Instead of negotiating contracts with thousands of doctors 
and hospitals individually to get the best prices, insurers prefer to set 
price schedules sufficiently high to entice providers to participate in 
their networks.
13
 Moreover, a patient who pays more for the 
monopoly-priced services may not even be effected because that 
patient’s co-pay can remain unchanged while the insurer raises 
premiums or deductibles for participants within the insurer’s other 
networks.
14
 These participants include employers that provide health 
insurance for their employees and individuals who purchase health 
plans for themselves.
15
 Employers can also pass the costs of more 
expensive premiums onto employees in the form of reduced 
compensation and benefits.
16
 This dynamic does not mitigate the 
effects of hospital price increases; it simply enables insurers to spread 
costs associated with monopoly pricing among their customers.
17
 In a 
word, every insured person pays. 
 
B. Bad Side Effects: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act & 
Consolidation 
 
To achieve the ACA’s goal of delivering better quality at lower 
costs, the ACA promotes the formation of Accountable Care 
                                                 
12
 Julie Creswell, A Hospital War Reflects a Bind for Doctors in the U.S., N.Y. 




 Nichols, supra note 5, at 11; Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust 
Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 681–82 (2010). 
14 
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 ACOs are networks of hospitals and 
doctors that take responsibility for specific Medicare patient 
populations.
19
 The ACOs participate in the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program, which provides financial incentives to ACOs for reducing 
healthcare costs.
20
 This new approach to care promotes the formation 
of regional integrated networks
21
 that will inevitably serve patients 
who are privately insured as well as Medicare patients.
22
 On a high 
level, the ACA forces the hospital sector to pursue cost-efficiency 
measures, which includes consolidating services and facilities and 
clinical integration.
23
 However, a side effect of this integration is 
consolidation, and the ACA has caused a frenzy of hospital mergers as 
providers attempt to share savings and costs to cash in on incentives.
24
 
For instance, in 2011, 301 hospital and clinic merger deals were 
recorded, and healthcare deal volume is anticipated to remain active.
25
  
The ACA has prompted both horizontal and vertical mergers as 
well.
26
 Horizontal mergers include primary care networks and 
hospitals buying out other hospitals to increase their geographic 
footprints.
27
 Vertical consolidations include hospitals acquiring 
                                                 
18
 Robert Pear, Consumer Risks Feared as Health Law Spurs Mergers, N.Y. 









 See Andrew A. Kasper, Antitrust Review of Accountable Care 
Organizations: An Assessment of FTC and DOJ's Relaxed Approach to Regulating 
Physician-Hospital Networks, 90 N.C. L. REV. 203, 207 (2011) (noting antitrust 
concerns can arise when ACO participants market their services to private payors).  
23
 M&A International Inc., Hospitals and Clinics M&A Outlook: What’s the 
Prognosis for Deal Making?, M&A INTERNATIONAL, 6 (2012) 
http://www.mergers.net/uploads/media/MAI_Healthcare.Report_2012.pdf 
[hereinafter Hospitals and Clinics M&A Outlook]. 
24
 Pear, supra note 18.  
25
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primary care facilities and insurers acquiring hospitals and primary 
care service providers to diversify operations.
28
 Physician networks 
control the flow of patients to hospitals, and these networks are vital to 
making ACOs work by reducing readmissions.
29
 Therefore, hospitals 
are seeking to acquire physician practices to strengthen their service 
lines as opposed to building new practices.
30
 
Hospital consolidations have both beneficial and detrimental 
consequences. The benefits of consolidation include generating 
operational efficiencies, which causes prices to decrease.
31
 These 
efficiencies are particularly important for struggling hospitals that 
need to realize savings to continue operations.
32
 Consolidation can 
also help hospitals access the capital needed to make necessary 
investments in healthcare technology and electronic medical records 
systems.
33
 A significant detrimental effect of consolidation is that it 
can increase hospital bargaining power, which enables hospitals to 
raise prices even when the quality in healthcare delivery stagnates.
34
 
With so many causes for skyrocketing healthcare costs, 
determining whether consolidation has harmed or helped consumers is 
difficult.
35
 Because of this problem, past studies were inconclusive as 
to whether consolidation actually caused price increases.
36
 The lack of 








 Cory Capps & David Dranove, Hospital Consolidation and Negotiated PPO 
Prices, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 23, no.2 (2004): 175–181, 175. 
32
 Toby Singer, Beth Heifetz & Tara Stuckey Morrissey, The Pro-Competitive 






 Creswell, supra note 12. 
35
 Capps & Dranove, supra note 31, at 175. 
36
 See Graeme Hunter, Gregory K. Leonard & G. Steven Olley, Merger 
Retrospective: A Review, 23–FALL ANTITRUST 34, 39–40 (2008) (citing three 
separate studies of hospital mergers that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
6
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evidence as to the effect of hospital consolidations is one reason for 
the industry being highly concentrated today.
37
 More recently, post 
merger reviews that use better methods have confirmed that hospital 
consolidations contribute to price increases.
38
 For instance, a 2004 
study on the changes in hospital prices before and after a hospital 
merger found that consolidating hospitals tend to raise prices more 
than the median price increases in a given market.
39
 The alarming fact 
is that neither the FTC nor the DOJ challenged any of the mergers 
analyzed in the 2004 study.
40
 
Additionally, a hospital’s not-for-profit status is irrelevant in 
predicting whether it will exploit its market power.
41
 Not-for-profit 
hospitals are no more likely than for profit hospitals to increase 
spending on charity care resulting from their ability to charge higher 
prices.
42
 While true integration resulting from mergers can yield cost 
savings, the evidence shows that these cost savings are not passed on 
                                                                                                                   
that yielded different results with respect to the mergers’ effects on pricing). See also 
Hospital Consolidations and Healthcare Costs, supra note 11. 
37
 Hospital Consolidations and Healthcare Costs, supra note 11 (noting that 
the first generation of hospital merger studies showed that hospital mergers had no 
effect on prices). 
38
 Hospital Consolidations and Healthcare Costs, supra note 11; Dr. David 
Dranove, Changes in Health Care Financing & Organization: Viewing Health Care 
Consolidation through the Lens of the Economics of Strategy, 3, (March 2010), 
available at, 
http://www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/HCFOReportMarch2010.pdf 
[hereinafter Changes in Health Care Financing & Organization] (citing a joint DOJ 
and FTC study from 2004 as well as a study by the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation from 2006 finding that consolidation enables hospitals to charge higher 
prices). 
39
 Capps & Dranove, supra note 31, at 179. 
40
 Id. at 178, 180. 
41
 Martin Gaynor, Health Care Industry Consolidation: Facts, Impacts, and 
Policy Options or “How do you Reform Health Care with an 800 Pound Gorilla in 




 Id. at 18, 20. 
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 and the courts have only exacerbated the problem. 
 
II. ANTITRUST LAW APPLIED IN HEALTHCARE  
 
The last 20 years of antitrust hospital litigation has resulted in 
varied outcomes.
44
 In the 1980s until the early 1990s, the FTC and 
DOJ (collectively, the “Regulators”) successfully blocked every 
anticompetitive hospital merger.
45
 However, starting in the mid-1990s 
through 2001, the Regulators lost seven successive cases,
46
 and they 
stopped opposing hospital mergers in spite of their concerns about the 
mergers’ anticompetitive effects.
47
 These challenges to hospital 
mergers were unsuccessful because the courts held that the hospitals’ 
geographic market definitions were too narrow,
48
 or the defendants 
showed that the merger benefited consumers by exploiting 
efficiencies.
49
 After these losses, the agencies focused their attention 
on post-merger reviews.
50
 Due to mounting evidence of abuses of 




                                                 
43
 Id. at 19. 
44
 Toby G. Singer, Mergers: Antitrust Issues for Hospitals and Health Plans 
Hospital Mergers, AHLA-PAPERS P06300812 (American Health Lawyers Ass’n 
Seminar Materials, San Francisco, Cal.), June 30, 2008, at 24 [hereinafter AHLA 
Seminar Papers]. 
45
 Capps & Dranove, supra note 31, at 175.  
46
 AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 25. 
47
 Capps & Dranove, supra note 31, at 175.  
48
 AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 25. 
49
 Erica L. Rice, Note, Evanston’s Legacy: A Prescription for Addressing Two-
Stage Competition in Hospital Merger Antitrust Analysis, 90 B.U. L. REV. 431, 442 
(2010). 
50
 Capps & Dranove, supra note 31, at 175.  
51
 Dr. David Dranove, Viewing Health Care Consolidation through the Lens of 
the Economics of Strategy (Mar. 2010), 1, available at, 
http://www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/HCFOReportMarch2010.pdf. 
8
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In most merger cases, the Regulators challenge mergers before 
they are consummated.
52
 Pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvement Act, sizable firms that wish to merge must notify the 
Regulators.
53
 The merger cannot be completed for another thirty days 
during which the Regulators review the merger to determine whether it 
will be anticompetitive.
54
 If the Regulators find that the merger will 
have anticompetitive effects, they can seek a preliminary injunction to 
stop it.
55




However, hospitals took their pre-merger reviews to the courts, 
and did so with success.
57
 When Regulators challenge a merger, the 
first and most crucial step is defining the market.
58
 If the market is 
improperly defined, it is impossible to quantify a merger’s effects.
59
 
Because market definition greatly impacts the outcome of antitrust 




The relevant market is comprised of (1) the product market and 
(2) the geographic market.
61
 Product market boundaries are defined by 
“the reasonable interchangeability of use [by consumers] or the cross-
elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for 
it.”
62
 Interchangeability is based on (1) the similarity of a substitute 
product to the product in question and (2) consumers’ willingness to 
                                                 
52
 Rice, supra note 49, at 433–34. 
53






 Id.  
57
 See AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 25 (noting that of the seven 
hospital merger cases that the FTC lost from the mid-1990s to 2001, the FTC sought 
to enjoin proposed mergers in six cases). 
58






 Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 
43. 
62
 Id. at 45 (internal quotations omitted). 
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buy the substitute product.
63
 Hospitals generally do not challenge 
product market definitions in enforcement actions.
64
 The geographic 
market is the “area of effective competition” where the seller operates 
and to which consumers can turn for products.
65
 The geographic 
market is a region where a monopolist could impose a price increase 
without changing its terms of sale.
66 In winning court battles against 
the Regulators, hospitals have successfully persuaded judges to rely on 
inapplicable tests to define their geographic markets.
67  
For example, courts frequently relied on the Elzinga-Hogarty test 
to reject the Regulators’ proposed geographic market.
68
 The Elzinga-
Hogarty test is premised on the idea that patient flow data will reveal 
which hospitals patients in a particular geographic area can use for 
their care.
69
 If patients within a geographic market use hospitals 
outside the area, this use implies that hospitals outside the area act as 
checks on the local hospital’s exercise of market power.
70
 Hospitals 
produced evidence that more than ten percent “of patients traveled 
outside the local community for care.”
71
 Hospitals argued that they, 
therefore, faced substantial competition outside their communities.
72
  
The problem with the Elzinga-Hogarty test is that it does not 
adequately address hospital markets’ idiosyncrasies because the test 
ignores patients’ insensitivity to hospital prices.
73
 The reason for this 
lack of price sensitivity is that the third party payor shields patients 




 Rice, supra note 49, at 436. 
65
 Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 
48 (internal quotations omitted). 
66
 Id. at 48. 
67
 AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 26. 
68
 Id. at 25. 
69








 AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 26.  
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from knowing hospital service costs.
74
 Without this information, 
patients cannot compare prices among local hospitals.
75
 The Elzinga-
Hogarty test, which originally studied coal markets in 1973, does not 
account for patients’ willingness to travel to hospitals based on factors 
such as proximity and reputation.
76
 Economists watched these cases in 
disbelief.
77
 It made little sense to rely on a test designed to study 
markets for homogenous goods and apply it to hospital markets, which 
are characterized by selective contracting and differentiation.
78
  
In addition to persuading courts to rely on irrelevant market 
definitions, hospitals also successfully claimed that their mergers 
would exploit efficiencies, the benefits of which will be passed to 
patients.
79
 Generally, mergers that yield cost savings are not 
considered anticompetitive.
80
 In determining whether efficiencies 
outweigh any anticompetitive effects, Regulators consider only 
efficiencies that are specific to the merger.
81
 Because delivering care is 
operationally complex, hospitals can easily show efficiencies ranging 
from decreased costs in providing laboratory services to administrative 
services, which can include operations as insignificant as the hospital 
cafeteria.
82
 At one time, courts viewed this defense with suspicion, and 
they would generally rule that operational efficiencies could be 
realized by other means.
83
 However, from 1995 to 2002, this defense 




The Regulators’ inability to stop hospital mergers has created 




 See id. 
76
 See Changes in Health Care Financing & Organization, supra note 38, at 3. 
77




 See Rice, supra note 49, at 441. 
80
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highly concentrated markets as measured by the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (“HHI”), a measure that the Regulators themselves 
use to measure market concentration.
85
 To calculate HHI, each firm’s 
market share is squared, and the results are then summed.
86
 For 
instance, if a firm controlled 100% of the market, the HHI would be 
10,000, or 100 squared.
87
 On the other hand, if there were thousands of 
firms in a market, each firm’s market share would be approximately 
0%, resulting in an HHI measurement of 0.
88
  
The Regulators have identified three types of markets: (1) 
unconcentrated markets where HHI is below 1,500; (2) moderately 
concentrated markets where HHI is between 1,500 and 2,500; and (3) 
highly concentrated markets where HHI is above 2,500.
89
 In 1992, 
hospital market concentration averaged 2,440, which is equivalent to 
four equal sized firms in one market.
90
 In 2006, the average HHI for 
hospital markets grew to 3,261, which is equivalent to three equal 
sized firms per metropolitan area.
91








                                                 
85
 See U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, (Aug. 19, 2010) §5.3, available at, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html (explaining that HHI 




 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index – HHI, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hhi.asp#axzz2AX6BbP7K (last visited Jan. 




 U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, (Aug. 19, 2010) §5.3, available at, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html. 
90
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III. THE NORTHSHORE LITIGATION: FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
HEARING TO THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
The predecessor to Messner was an FTC administrative action 
brought against Evanston Northwestern Health Corporation 
(“EHC”).
93
 This case is significant for two reasons. First, until the 
EHC action, the FTC had not successfully challenged a hospital 
merger in over a decade.
94
 Second, the FTC won the case by 
redefining the hospital market and using a two-tiered approach to 
analyze the merger’s anticompetitive effects.
95
  
Given the difficulty in persuading courts that hospital geographic 
markets should be narrowly defined, the FTC tried a new approach in 
its case against EHC.
96
 On January 1, 2000, EHC, which was 
comprised of Glenbrook Hospital in Glenview, Illinois and Evanston 
Northwestern Hospital in Evanston, Illinois, merged with Highland 
Park Hospital in Highland Park, Illinois.
97
 EHC changed its name to 
Northshore University HealthSystem (“Northshore”) after the 
merger.
98
 In February 2004, the FTC initiated an administrative action 
against Northshore and claimed that the merger violated Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act.
99
 In Count I of its complaint, the FTC defined the 
product market as “general acute care inpatient hospital services sold 
to private pay[ors]” as opposed to the consumers of hospital services, 
i.e., the patients.
100
 Under this framework, hospital competition was 
analyzed under a two-tiered approach.
101
 The FTC argued that the first 
                                                 
93
 Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 809 (7th Cir. 
2012), reh’g denied (Feb. 28, 2012). 
94
 Rice, supra note 49, at 432. 
95
 AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 27. 
96
 Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 
27. 
97
 Messner, 669 F.3d at 809. 
98








Bacallao: <em>Messner</em>'s Effect on Hospital Consolidation and Anticompe
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2012




tier of competition occurs when hospitals compete to be included in 
private third party payor networks.
102
 The second tier of competition 
occurs when hospitals compete with each other for patients.
103
 The 
FTC argued that the second tier of competition is often based on non-
price criteria such as quality of care.
104
 Count II focused on the 
merger’s anticompetitive effects rather than the health network’s 
newly formed geographic area.
105
 According to the FTC, the 
geographic market was irrelevant in light of the merger’s 
anticompetitive impact.
106
 The administrative law judge ruled in favor 
of the FTC and ordered EHC to divest Highland Park Hospital.
107
 
EHC appealed to the Commission.
108
 
On appeal, the Commission determined that the merger allowed 
Northshore to use its market power to increase prices.
109
 In reaching 
this decision, the Commission focused on the hospitals’ pre-merger 
business records and testimony from the creators of the Elzinga-
Hogarty test.
110
 EHC had hired Bain Consulting to assist with the 
merger’s strategic planning, and Bain determined that EHC would be 
in a stronger position to renegotiate contracts with insurers after the 
merger.
111
 EHC and Highland Park Hospital’s pre-merger board 
minutes also included statements from their respective officers and 
directors in which they concluded that the merger would allow the 
new hospital network to strengthen its negotiating capabilities.
112
  






 Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2005 WL 2845790, at 
*16 (F.T.C. Oct. 20, 2005). 
105








 AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 28. 
110
 Id. at 28, 30. 
111
 Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 
11. 
112 
Id. at 10–11. 
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More significantly, the decision “downplayed the use of patient 
origin data and suggested that such data will have only a limited 
applicability in FTC cases going forward.”
113
 The Commission heard 
testimony from the creators of the Elzinga-Hogarty test who testified 
that the model was inapplicable to healthcare systems because patients 
do not necessarily choose hospitals based on price.
114
 In fact, Professor 
Kenneth Elzinga explained that patients “rarely fully internalize the 




Because divestiture would have been costly, the Commission 
ordered independent contracting teams – one for Evanston 
Northwestern Hospital and Glenbrook Hospital and a separate team 
for Highland Park Hospital.
116
 The order required that the hospital 
network set up a firewall between Highland Park and the other two 
hospitals, and the negotiating teams were prohibited from sharing 
information with each other.
117
  
In April 2008, Steven Messner filed a class action suit against 
Northshore.
118
 Other plaintiffs had filed similar actions that were 
consolidated into one case, and they moved for class certification 
pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3).
119
 The plaintiffs defined their class as 
individuals and entities that purchased “inpatient hospital services or 
hospital-based outpatient serviced directly from Northshore . . . from 
at least as early as January 1, 2000 to the present.”
120
 The plaintiffs 
claimed that the merger between Highland Park Hospital and EHC 
                                                 
113




 Id. at 31. 
116





 Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 809 (7th Cir. 
2012), reh’g denied (Feb. 28, 2012). 
119
 Id. at 810. 
120
 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
121
 Plaintiffs sought class 
certification, along with injunctive relief and treble damages pursuant 
to Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
122
 
The first issue for the Seventh Circuit was whether the district 
court made a procedural error in failing to subject Northshore’s expert 
report to a Daubert review.
123
 According to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, expert testimony must (1) assist the trier of fact in 
understanding the evidence or in determining a fact issue; (2) be based 
on sufficient data or facts; and (3) be produced with reliable methods 
that have been applied to the facts of the case.
124
 Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals interpreted the reliability prong to mean that an 
expert’s methodology is reliable and scientifically valid if it is 
grounded in the scientific method.
125
 Factors for reliability include 
whether the technique has gained widespread acceptance, been peer 
reviewed, and been published.
126
  
The plaintiffs in Messner moved to exclude Northshore’s expert 
report by arguing that the “economic analyses are fundamentally 
defective.”
127
 The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion 
explaining that the report was given “the weight [the Court] believes it 
[was] due.”
128
 The Seventh Circuit held that when an expert’s opinion 
is critical to certifying a class, the district court must conduct a 
Daubert review on any challenge to the expert’s submissions or 
qualifications before ruling on a motion for class certification.
129
  
The second issue was whether the district court incorrectly 
applied the predominance requirement with respect to antitrust impact 
                                                 
121
 Id. at 808; 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
122
 Messner, 669 F.3d at 808 (internal quotations omitted); 15 U.S.C. §15. 
123
 Messner, 669 F.3d at 811. 
124
 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
125
 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–3 (1993). 
126
 Id. at 593. 
127
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or “fact of damage.”
130
 To become certified under FRCP 23(a), a class 
must show (1) numerosity, (2) commonality in questions of law or 
fact, (3) typicality of claims among the representatives, and (4) that 
“the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.”
131
 A proposed class must always satisfy the 
FRCP 23(a) requirements before seeking certification pursuant to 
FRCP 23(b)(3).
132
 In order to certify a class under FRCP 23(b)(3), the 
court must find “that the questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods 
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”
133
 FRCP 
23(b)’s predominance requirement is satisfied when common 
questions representing “a significant aspect of a case . . . can be 
resolved for all members of a class in a single adjudication.”
134
  
The first step in a predominance analysis is for the court to 
examine the underlying elements of the cause of action.
135
 In antitrust 
cases, plaintiffs must show that (1) the defendant violated an antitrust 
law and that (2) the violation caused an injury.
136
 The Seventh Circuit 
disagreed with the district court as to how far the plaintiffs needed to 
go to show predominance with respect to antitrust injury, also known 
as antitrust impact, at the class certification stage.
137
  
To demonstrate antitrust impact, plaintiffs relied on a “difference 
in differences” analysis (“DID analysis”).
138
 DID analyses are useful 
tools for studying the effects of mergers because such analyses 
compare prices before a given event, in this case a merger, to prices 
                                                 
130
 Id. at 814. 
131
 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
132
 Messner, 699 F.3d at 811. 
133
 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
134








 Id. at 808. 
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 The analysis controls for other economic factors that 
may cause prices to change by first identifying other products or 
geographic markets in which economic factors other than the merger 
itself caused price changes.
140
 The merger’s effect is quantified by 
comparing the “control group’s” price changes to the subject 
hospital’s prices changes before and after the merger.
141
 Plaintiff’s 
expert was Northwestern University economist, Dr. David Dranove 
(“Dranove”).
142
 His DID analysis compared the percentage increase in 
prices for services after the merger to those of a control group, 
consisting of local hospitals that were subject to the same market 
forces as Northshore.
143
 The district court declined to certify plaintiffs’ 
class because it concluded that the expert’s analysis needed to show 
that prices increased uniformly.
144
 Due to a lack of uniform prices 
charged to payors, the district court held that the plaintiffs could not 
show predominance and denied class certification.
145
  
The district court focused on the fact that hospitals charge payors 
different prices.
146
 For instance, prices for insurers that negotiate 
multi-year contracts for services may differ from those that renegotiate 
each year.
147
 Moreover, insurers will negotiate contracts that cover 
bundles of services.
148
 For example, a bill for a Caesarian section 
could include “anesthesia, operating room use, surgeon’s fee, post-
operative care for the mother, newborn care for the baby, etc.”
149
 
Hospitals may unbundle and re-bundle these services so that two 
                                                 
139
 See Graeme Hunter, Gregory K. Leonard & G. Steven Olley, Merger 
Retrospective: A Review, 23 NO. 1 ANTITRUST MAGAZINE 34, 35 (2008).  
140








 Id. at 817–18. 
145




 Id. at 818. 
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purchasers pay different amounts for the same Caesarian section.
150
 
Furthermore, the market prices of each individual component can vary 
depending on the standard of care and advances in technology.
151
 In 
particular, the district court focused on data in Dranove’s reply report 
detailing increases in prices for “Payor A.”
152
 In denying class 
certification, the district court judge asserted that “of the 18 prices 
listed in [Payor A’s] renegotiated September 22, 2002 contract, 6 
increased at a uniform rate, 9 increased at variable rates, and 3 
changed pricing methodologies from the previous contract, making it 
difficult to draw a comparison.”
153
 
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court misapplied Rule 
23(b)(3)’s predominance standard because it required a test that was 
too stringent at the class certification stage.
154
 The Court explained 
that the ability to use “common evidence and common methodology to 
prove a class’s claims is sufficient to support a finding of 
predominance on the issue of antitrust impact for certification under 
Rule 23(b)(3).”
155
 Dranove claimed the he could use post merger price 
increases, which would constitute common evidence, to show that 
“insurers and individuals who received coverage through those 
insurers suffered some antitrust injury” caused by the merger.
156
 
Dranove further explained that he could adapt his methodology 
whenever price increases varied by conducting as many DID analyses 
as were required when the price increases were non-uniform.
157
 “In 
this way, Dranove explained, he would be able to calculate ‘different 






 Id. at 821. 
153
 Id. at 821 (citing Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp. Antitrust Litig., 
268 F.R.D. 56, 86 (N.D. Ill. 2010)). 
154
 Id. at 818. 
155
 Id. at 819. 
156
 Id. at 818. 
157
 Id. at 820. 
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overcharges across different services categories’ despite any non-
uniform increase in the prices charged for those services.”
158
 
For instance, the Court examined prices from 2000 and 2002 and 
noted that “[t]he prices for eight categories of inpatient services all 
increased by approximately 6.0 percent.”
159
 During the same period, 
the price structure remained unchanged for two categories of 
outpatient services while a third category changed its price structure 
“from a flat rate per case to a percentage of the billed charges.”
160
 
Further, the Court examined price variations in cardiac services across 
nine sub-categories.
161
 Prices for five subcategories decreased between 
9.3% and 13.0%; two subcategories increased 14.8% and 60%, 
respectively; and two subcategories changed their billing structure.
162
 
On their face, prices for cardiac services appeared to decrease; 
however, a closer examination revealed that prices from 2000 included 
the physicians’ services whereas the 2002 prices did not.
163
 The Court 
believed that “[t]hese superficially non-uniform changes in prices 
therefore merely pose the sort of manageable challenge that Dranove's 




The third issue was whether the class was defined 
appropriately.
165
 Northshore argued that the class contained 
individuals “who were not injured by Northshore’s alleged exercise of 
market power.”
166
 For example, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois had 
submitted an affidavit stating that it was not affected by post merger 
price increases.
167
 The class also included individuals who “met their 
                                                 
158
 Id. at 820–21. 
159










 Id. at 821–22. 
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annual plan out-of-pocket maximum or their deductible regardless of 
any price increase, as well as those individuals whose contracts 
protect[] against price increases.” 
168
 The Court stated that defining a 
class in such a way as to avoid being over and under-inclusive “is 
more of an art than a science.”
169
 Because Northshore failed to specify 
the number of individuals in the class that could not have been harmed 
by the merger and only 2.4% of the class actually “paid only their out-
of-pocket maximums or deductibles,” Northshore failed to show that 
the class was overbroad.
170
 The Seventh Circuit vacated the district 




IV. MESSNER’S IMPACT 
 
The purpose of antitrust laws is to eliminate anticompetitive 
practices and promote a competitive economy in which enterprises 
compete on the basis of service, quality, and price.
172
 The undesirable 
effects of hospital consolidation combined with the fact that the 
Commission’s civil penalty against EHC was considered a mere “slap 
on the wrist” seriously undermines competition and quality of care.
173
 
For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Messner has 
important consequences in that it provides a framework for how other 
hospital antitrust class actions can become certified. Whether Messner 
will actually deter anticompetitive conduct depends on (1) the effect of 
the Court’s Daubert ruling, (2) current trends in class action litigation, 
and (3) private payors initiating these actions. If Messner has no 
deterrent effect, the Regulators alone will police hospitals. 
 
                                                 
168
 Id. at 824 (internal quotations omitted). 
169
 Id. at 825. 
170
 Id. at 825–86. 
171
 Id. at 826. 
172
 Philip A. Proger, Primer on Antitrust in Healthcare, AHLA-PAPERS 
P05170101, 2 (2001). 
173
 Telephone Interview with Dr. David Dranove, Professor of Health Industry 
Management, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University (Oct. 15, 
2012) [hereinafter Dranove Interview]. 
21
Bacallao: <em>Messner</em>'s Effect on Hospital Consolidation and Anticompe
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2012




A. The Effect of the Daubert Ruling  
 
At first blush, the Seventh Circuit’s Daubert ruling appears to 
impose another hurdle for class certification. However, I argue that the 
absence of a Daubert challenge to the plaintiff’s DID analysis 
provides a framework for future antitrust class actions involving 
hospital mergers, which currently are extremely rare.
174
 According to a 
2002 study of trends in antitrust healthcare litigation, solo or small 
group physician practices were the largest plaintiff group by far, 
accounting for 53% of all plaintiffs, and hospitals constituted the 
largest defendant pool, accounting for 61% of all defendants.
175
 These 
cases mostly concern disputes over staff privileges.
176
 Because 
Messner is such a unique case, it paves the way for other cases that 
challenge hospital monopolies to become certified in light of the 
complex analyses that courts undertake in ruling on Rule 23 motions.  
In deciding whether to certify a class, Rule 23 requires courts to 
walk a fine line – particularly in cases like Messner where the 
plaintiffs rely on expert testimony. Demonstrating common impact in 
class actions is a complex task, and yet, it is important that class 
certification not be turned into a trial on the merits.
177
 The question of 
whether to grant certification is a procedural one, in which plaintiffs 
need only show that they can use common evidence to prove their 
claims after certification.
178
 Because of these requirements, fact-
finding is generally necessary to address issues pertaining to the 
plaintiff’s proposed methodology.
179
 But defendants often attempt to 
turn certification into a trial on the merits by asking the court to 
                                                 
174
 Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and 
the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 570 (2002). 
175
 Id. at 566.  
176
 Id. at 568. 
177
 Ellen Meriwether, Rigorous Analysis in Certification of Antitrust Class 






Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 2
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol8/iss1/2




perform “a rigorous Rule 23 analysis.”
180
 These tactics usurp the 
jury’s role in resolving questions of fact.
181
 In Amchem Products Inc. 
v. Windsor, the Supreme Court noted that “no reading of Rule 23 can 
ignore the Rules Enabling Act's mandate that ‘rules of procedure shall 
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”’
182
 Therefore, 
questions pertaining to antitrust impact should be for the jury at trial, 
not the judge in ruling on a motion to certify.
183
 Nonetheless, 
determining whether to certify a class may require courts to consider 
the merits because the legal issues surrounding Rule 23 are often 
enmeshed with factual questions.
184
  
Reconciling these concepts—avoiding fact-finding while 
determining whether Rule 23 requirements are met—is a muddy 
process in antitrust cases.
185
 The major issue in certifying an antirust 
class action is predominance, or antitrust injury, which is proven by 
running common evidence through an economic model to show how 
the defendant’s conduct impacted prices.
186
 At the same time, that 
economic model can refute the notion that common impact exists.
187
 
Because this approach would violate the Rules Enabling Act, most 




The tension between satisfying Rule 23 and avoiding fact-finding 
has caused disagreement among circuit courts as to how rigorously 
expert witness testimony should be scrutinized at the class certification 






 Id. (citing Anchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) 
(internal quotations omitted)).  
183
 Id. at 55. 
184
 Id. at 56–57. 
185
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 In Behrend v. Comcast Corporation, the Supreme Court is 
currently deciding whether expert testimony should undergo a Daubert 
review at the class certification stage.
190
 In American Honda Motor 
Company v. Allen the Seventh Circuit held that a Daubert review is 
necessary whenever there is a challenge to expert testimony that is 
critical to class certification,
191
 and the Court again reinforced this 
ruling in Messner.
192
 However, not all courts follow this approach.
193
 
In refraining from dealing with “battles of the experts” during class 
certification, some courts hold that plaintiffs only need offer a valid 
method that they can use to prove common impact.
194
 While these 
courts are more deferential to experts and scrutinize their findings less, 
they are becoming a rarity.
195
 For instance, the Third Circuit, a court 
formerly known for being certification friendly, recently began 
requiring more rigorous scrutiny of expert testimony for class 
certification.
196
 In In re: Hydrogen Peroxide, the Third Circuit held 
                                                 
189
 See Stephen Mahle, BUSINESS LITIGATION IN FLORIDA §13.48 (7th ed. 
2012) (discussing the circuits where a Daubert review is required at the class 
certification stage when the opposing party challenges expert testimony). 
190
 Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011) cert. granted in 
part, 133 S. Ct. 24 (U.S. June 25, 2012). 
191
 Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2010). 
192
 Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 
2012), reh’g denied (Feb. 28, 2012). See also Bruce D. Sokler, et al., Antitrust and 




 The Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes declined to rule on 
whether Daubert applied to expert testimony at the class certification stage. 131 
S.Ct. 2541, 2553–54 (2011). However, the Court strongly hinted that it did. Id. 
194
 Donald Hawthorne & Margaret Sanderson, Rigorous Analysis of Economic 
Evidence on Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 24–FALL ANTITRUST 55, 55-56 
(2009). 
195
 See id. at 55 (noting that a majority of “federal courts of appeals no longer 
follow[] this deferential approach but now require[] a rigorous assessment of expert 
evidence and merits-related issues, supported by findings of fact to explain why class 
certification is or is not warranted”). 
196
 Id.  
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that in determining whether to certify a class, each requirement of 
Rule 23 must be satisfied, and courts cannot merely rely on a 
“threshold showing” by a party.
197
 In addition, the Third Circuit 
explained that it must also “resolve all factual or legal disputes 
relevant to class certification, even if they overlap with the merits—
including disputes touching on elements of the cause of action.”
198
 
Even if the Supreme Court adopts the Seventh Circuit’s 
requirement for a Daubert review, such a ruling will not prevent 
hospital antitrust classes that rely on DID analyses from becoming 
certified. Indeed, expert testimony can be critical in motions to certify 
antitrust class actions. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that antitrust impact 
is capable of proof at trial, and this demonstration often involves an 
economic construct that establishes the defendant’s abuse of market 
power.
199
 Though a Daubert review is the most stringent review for an 
expert’s methodology, DID analyses pass Daubert reviews with flying 
colors. 
For economic models to withstand Daubert review, the expert 
who created them must rely on a methodology that is scientifically 
valid, an indicia of which is widespread acceptance.
200
 Though not 
much has been written about DID analyses in legal scholarship, this 
methodology has gained widespread acceptance as evidenced by the 
use of DID analyses throughout the EHC litigation. During the 
administrative action, both the FTC and EHC relied on DID analyses 
without any Daubert challenges on either side.
201
 While the FTC does 
not abide by the rules of evidence in its hearings, the Commission 
does follow “the spirit of Daubert” in determining expert testimony 
                                                 
197 




 Interview with Hal Morris, Partner, Arnstein & Lehr, in Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 
25, 2012). 
200
 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–3 (1993). 
201
 Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 
24; Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2005 WL 2845790 (F.T.C. 
Oct. 20, 2005). 
25
Bacallao: <em>Messner</em>'s Effect on Hospital Consolidation and Anticompe
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2012






 Admittedly, an administrative agency’s use of a 
particular methodology does not necessarily mean that the federal 
courts will accept it,
203
 but it does indicate that the methodology is 
widely accepted. Furthermore, if Dranove’s DID analysis were truly 
flawed, Northshore would have challenged it
204
—just as the plaintiffs 
challenged Northshore’s expert report.
205
  
In addition to being widely used, DID analyses are very powerful 
in that they can control for other causes for price increase when 
studying a merger’s effects.
206
 This attribute lends credence to the 
methodology’s reliability. For instance, in the EHC litigation, the FTC 
identified ten factors, including the merger, that could account for 
EHC’s price increases.
207
 These other factors were:  
 
(1) Overall increases in costs that affected other Chicago-area 
hospitals;  
(2) Changes in regulation;  
(3) Increases in demand;  
(4) Increases in quality at EHC above that of other Chicago area 
hospitals; 
(5) Changes in the complexity of patient cases; 
(6) Changes in payment mix; 
(7) Increases in teaching intensity;  
                                                 
202 
In the Matter of Telebrands Corp., TV Sav., LLC, and Ajit Khubani, 140 
F.T.C. 278, 346 n.32 (2005). 
203
 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 153 (1997) (J. Stevens 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (where expert testimony that relied on the 
same methodology that the Environmental Protection Agency used was 
inadmissible). 
204
 See, e.g., In re: Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3rd. 
Cir. 2008) (noting that a “court's obligation to consider all relevant evidence and 
arguments extends to expert testimony, whether offered by a party seeking class 
certification or by a party opposing it”). 
205
 Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 
2012), reh’g denied (Feb. 28, 2012). 
206
 See Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 
6, at 22 (relying on a DID analysis to control for other causes of price increases). 
207
 Id.  
26
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(8) Decreases in prices charged for outpatient services to managed 
care organizations; 
(9) EHC learning about demand for services from Highland Park 
Hospital’s pricing data; 




The FTC’s expert concluded that the first three causes for price 
increases were benign, and the expert then created three control groups 
based on these benign factors for her DID analyses.
209 
With these 
control groups, the expert quantified the impact of the benign factors 
on prices.
210
 The expert then performed another DID analysis to 
determine whether patient mix, customer mix, and teaching intensity, 
factors five through seven, could have caused the price increases at 
EHC.
211
 The expert concluded that these factors differed significantly 
between the control group and EHC, meaning that the control group 
could not be used to quantify these factors’ effects.
212
 The expert then 
performed a linear regression analysis that compared factors five 
through seven to Illinois payor data.
213
 After quantifying the effect of 
factors five through seven via the regression analysis, the expert then 
concluded that any post-merger price increases that could not be 




Given the power of DID analyses to control for benign variables 
that influence prices and its widespread use, a properly performed DID 
analysis can easily satisfy Daubert’s reliability prong. Even if the 
Supreme Court decides that Daubert reviews are required at class 
certification, such a ruling will not deter hospital antitrust suits. But, 
despite the existence of a sound model for quantifying monopolistic 




 Id. at 24. 
210
 Id.  
211




 Id. at 26–7. 
214
 Id. at 27. 
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practices, future anticompetitive conduct will only be deterred if cases 
are brought against those who engage in these illegal practices.  
 
B. Trends in Class Action Litigation and the Role of the Private 
Payor in Vindicating Rights 
 
Antitrust law provides a private right of action with harsh 
monetary penalties to incentivize private attorneys to litigate for the 
public good
215
 and serve various other public policy purposes such as 
compensation, deterrence, and supplementation of the government 
action.
216
 Private antitrust suits are also often litigated as class actions 
because individual consumers may suffer only a small amount of 
damages when a violator unlawfully abuses its market power.
217
 
Without the class action mechanism, consumers would abandon their 
claims because litigation would not be worth their while.
218
 However, 
settlement, management turnover, and insurers’ apathy toward 
monopoly pricing frustrate antitrust law’s public policy goals. 
 
1. Settlement: Thwarting Compensation and Deterrence  
 
Private antitrust remedies compensate plaintiffs for both the 
injuries they suffer and the cost of litigation, and they deter 
anticompetitive conduct by making monopolistic practices less 
profitable.
219
 Prevailing plaintiffs in antitrust suits receive attorneys’ 
fees and treble damages, in the amount equal to three times 
damages.
220
 Treble damages compensate victims who must expend 
                                                 
215
 Meriwether, supra note 177, at 56. 
216
 Crane, supra note 13, at 678. 
217
 Christopher Leslie, De Facto Detrebling: The Rush to Settlement in 




 Leslie, supra note 217, at 1010. 
220
 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West). 
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enormous resources to hire expert witnesses.
221
 For instance, a DID 
analysis costs upwards of five hundred thousand dollars.
222
 Yet it is 
impossible to fully comprehend the deterrent and compensatory 
impact of antitrust class actions without understanding the effect of 
settlement. One particularly important aspect of settlement is that 
despite treble damages being mandatory, federal judges generally 
refuse to treble antitrust settlements.
223
 The reason for this approach is 
that treble damages imply fault whereas settlement does not, and 
settlement negotiations exempt defendants from conceding guilt.
224
 
Class actions’ effectiveness as a means to enforce antitrust law 
becomes suspect if class counsel rushes to settle to ensure significant 
payouts for the attorneys while considerably under compensating the 
class.
225
 These collusive settlements undermine “the deterrent effect of 
private lawsuits and, consequently, of antitrust laws more broadly.”
226
 
In an effort to curb these practices, Congress required federal judicial 
approval of class action settlements.
227
 Nevertheless, even this safety 
net is inadequate because reviewing judges refuse to treble antitrust 
damages when suits are settled, and the settlement rate is high in 
antitrust class actions.
228
 Therefore, the threat of treble damages is 




While settlement alleviates some of the risk for plaintiffs given 
the complexity and drawn-out nature of antitrust litigation, the 
majority of settlements deny antitrust victims full recovery of the 
                                                 
221
 J. Douglas Richards, What Makes an Antitrust Class Action Remedy 
Successful?: A Tale of Two Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 621, 633 (2005). 
222
 Dranove Interview, supra note 173. 
223
 Leslie, supra note 217, at 1018. 
224
 Id. at 1024. 
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 Class actions suffer from classic agency 
problems because class counsel controls the settlement process and 
class members generally do not monitor their case.
231
 The disconnect 
between counsel and the clients benefits the defendant, who aims to 
minimize expenditures and includes litigation costs in its payment to 
the class.
232
 Defendants are also indifferent to the allocation of the 
payout between class and counsel.
233
 Therefore, settlement 
negotiations provide class counsel “an opportunity to entice 
defendants to reduce their total payments by providing counsel with 
generous fees but affording inadequate compensation to the class.”
234
 
Hence, settlements deny class members their legal remedies, fail to 
disgorge the defendant’s ill-gotten gains, and potentially render 




2. Hospital Management Passes the Buck 
 
For private antitrust litigation to serve its deterrent purpose, the 
plaintiffs’ remedies also must directly impact the individuals within 
hospitals who engage in anticompetitive conduct.
236
 Unfortunately, the 
individuals who have the authority to approve a hospital merger are in 
upper-level management, and private antitrust litigation often outlasts 
the tenure of a hospital CEO.
237
 In short, turnover thwarts the deterrent 
objective because upper level management does not internalize the 
effects of an antitrust judgment.
238
  
                                                 
230
 Id. at 1014. 
231
 Id. at 1015. 
232




 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
235
 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
236
 Crane, supra note 13, at 690. 
237
 See id. (describing this phenomena in the private sector). 
238
 Id. at 694.  
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The average time to dispose of a civil case in federal court was 
18.5 months in 1996, and it increased to 24.6 months in 2007.
239
 
Because of the complexities of antitrust litigation, these cases are 
undoubtedly litigated for longer periods of time than others.
240
 For 
instance, in 2007, 378 federal antitrust cases had been pending for 
more than three years.
241
 Based on these numbers, the estimated length 
of time from planning anticompetitive conduct to payment of a 
substantial settlement exceeds five years.
242
 At the same time, the 
average tenure of a hospital CEO is 3.8 years.
243
  
Compounding the problem is the fact that C-suite pay at a health 
system is approximately 40% more than at an independent hospital.
244
 
Such a large difference in pay indicates that there are strong incentives 
for upper-level management to grow a hospital, and the easiest way to 
grow an organization is through consolidation. There is also little 
evidence to suggest that an antitrust judgment could harm a manager’s 
reputation because the decision to engage in anticompetitive conduct 
is often a collective one.
245




On the other hand, upper level management is not completely 
unscathed by antitrust litigation. For one, these lawsuits are expensive 
and time consuming, and defendants disproportionately bear the 
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 Id. at 691–2. 
240
 Id. at 692.  
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 See Sabrina Rodak, 11 Hospital, Health System Executive Compensation 
Trends, BECKER’S HOSPITAL REVIEW (May 8, 2012), 
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/compensation-issues/11-hospital-health-
system-executive-compensation-trends.html (percentage calculation based on data 
for 2011 C-suit hospital compensation). 
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 CEOs and CFOs also care greatly about containing legal 
fees,
248
 and becoming embroiled in a lawsuit that could take years to 
resolve is not ideal from a cost perspective. Settlement can also 
accelerate payouts, but these settlements generally occur on the eve of 
trial unless the case is a government tag along.
249
 
When management conduct brings increases in profits with only 
potential future liabilities, managers tend to choose immediate profits 
because they apply a discount to any future judgment.
250
 This is a 
financial concept known as the time value of money, where money 
today is worth more than money in the future. Additionally, the longer 
it takes to pay money out, the less its present value is worth. Given 
that the incentives to engage in anticompetitive behavior for short-
term gains outweigh the remote probability of being held accountable, 
managers will discount the threat of litigation.
251
 Hence, deterrence 
fails. 
 
3. Private Insurers’ Role in Supplementing Government Enforcement 
Actions 
 
Private antitrust litigation supplements government action because 
the government lacks the recourses to detect and prosecute all 
anticompetitive conduct.
252
 Detecting hospitals’ anticompetitive 
conduct is difficult, and only insurers are in a position to do so. Due to 
the complexities and lack of transparency associated with hospital 
billing, it is impossible for individual patients to know when they pay 
for monopoly-priced services.
253
 Because insurers negotiate service 
                                                 
247
 Id. at 695. 
248




 Id. at 694. 
251
 Id.  
252
 Leslie, supra note 217, at 1010. 
253
 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Price for a New Hip? Many Hospitals Are 
Stumped, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2013), available at 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/price-for-a-new-hip-many-hospitals-are-
stumped/?hp (describing that it is practically impossible for a patient to call a 
32
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 2
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol8/iss1/2




contracts with numerous hospitals, only they have the ability to 
compare price increases among providers within a market. By tracking 
price data, insurers can detect monopolistic activity even if there has 
been no government enforcement action. And indeed, insurers do 
monitor the cost of services closely. In the administrative hearing, 
insurers testified that EHC’s newly formed hospital network had more 
bargaining power, and contracting managers testified that the hospital 
network commanded substantial price increases post-merger.
254
  
However, there is no evidence to suggest that insurers are willing 
to sue providers,
255
 and they must be willing to do so to act as an 
effective market check. Because demand for health insurance is 
inelastic, meaning that an increase in price will not necessarily change 
demand,
256
 insurers are in a position to pass the cost of monopoly 
priced services to their customers. Therefore, insurers are not 
incentivized to bring antitrust suits. Increasing prices for consumers is 
much easier than becoming involved in expensive and time-consuming 
antitrust cases against hospitals. While insurers will express concern 
about a hospital’s anticompetitive conduct to Regulators, they prefer to 
maintain productive relationships with providers.
257
  
The history of the Messner case is a perfect example of insurers’ 
unwillingness to participate in antitrust actions. In the administrative 
hearing, the FTC’s expert found that EHC increased prices for Aetna, 
                                                                                                                   
hospital and get a quote for medial procedures). See also Messner v. Northshore 
Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 821 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied (Feb. 28, 
2012) (noting that over time the service contracts that Dranove studied in his expert 
report changed pricing methodologies). 
254
 Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 
13–19. 
255
 See Dranove Interview, supra note 173 (stating that insurers prefer to 
maintain good relationships with hospitals). 
256
 Su Liu & Deborah Chollet, Price and Income Elasticity of the Demand for 
Health Insurance and Health Care Services: A Critical Review of the Literature, 
MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC. (Mar. 24, 2006), available at, 
http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications/pdfs/priceincome.pdf. 
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 Dranove Interview, supra note 173. 
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Humana, United, and Great West anywhere from 21.3% to 93.2%,
258
 
and yet, none of these insurers participated in Messner.
259
 Given 
insurers’ unwillingness to bring these cases, the ruling in Messner is 
unlikely to spur private antitrust suits absent a prior government 




Ultimately, the Regulator’s role in monitoring and prosecuting 
anticompetitive conduct will become increasingly important as the 
ACA continues to prompt an unprecedented number of mergers. 
Unless insurers are forced to change either their contracting processes 
or their models for charging premiums, they will continue to be an 
ineffective market check. With enhanced market power, management 
at these newly formed hospital networks and ACOs will be tempted to 
leverage their negotiating power to increase revenues. The temptation 
to charge monopolistic prices will be particularly strong if Medicare 
reimbursement rates continue to decline (a likely scenario), and 
management is forced to rely on service contracts with private payors 
to increase revenues. 
However, if management does not temper its desire for higher 
profits, there will be consequences for hospitals. Should providers fail 
to produce better care coordination and lower healthcare costs, they 
will find themselves under immense political pressure and scrutiny to 
do so. Regulators, armed with a new approach to define hospital 
product markets, will conduct post-merger reviews and bring 
enforcement actions if necessary. At the very least, Messner provides a 
framework for future government tag along class actions. Though 
class actions cannot deter all of management’s anticompetitive 
                                                 
258
 Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 
21.  
259
 See Complaint at 3, Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation 
Antitrust Litigation, 2008 WL 4962356 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (No. 07-CV-4446) 
(plaintiffs listed in the most recent complaint include two individuals, a small Illinois 
corporation, and a union benefit plan).  
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conduct, Messner will have some deterrent effect given that it will 





                                                 
260
 Crane, supra note 13, at 697 n.103 (noting that deterrence is most effective 
among the targeted firm’s competitors). 
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